Language and Rules: a normative approach to the myth of the given by Giromini, José
Language and RuLes:
a noRmative appRoach to
the myth of the given1
José giromini
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
AbstrAct: The aim of this paper was to show that the specifically epistemological and semantic failures of the
Myth of the Given are a result of mistaken normative assumptions. The self-authenticating awareness of
particulars and the self meaning-giving semantic rules are different disguises wore over a skeleton of a
normative self-moving mover. The first episode I narrated was but a pure form of the third. Whatever his
solution may be, we owe to Wilfrid Sellars the philosophical miracle –opposite to the theological– of turning
three problems into one.
Key words: Myth of the given, epistemological failure, semantical failure, self-authenticating awareness, self
meaning-giving, normative self-moving mover.
Taula, quaderns de pensament
Universitat de les Illes Balears
ISSN: 0214-6657
núm. 46, 2014-2015
Pàg. 17-26
1 This paper was addressed at the Sellars Centenary Conference & Workshop (Dublin, June 2012).  
Data de recepció: 10-X-2013. Data d’acceptació: 30-I-2014. 
2 Giromini:Anthony Bonner  11/04/16  9:22  Página 17
18
In the first paragraph of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Sellars claims that
there is a common way of construing the philosophical situations or problems for the
resolution of which the Given is usually invoked. This he names the ‘framework of
givenness’ and warns us that almost no major thought system has resisted its influence.
Regardless this far-reaching remarks, philosophical common-sense often takes only
immediate experience to be what Sellars rejects under the heading of the Myth of the
Given.2 And this is connected with the idea that the Myth consists in the postulation of
some sort of self-authenticating awareness. I regard this as true but superficial. I grant
that the Myth involves the postulation of an unexplained awareness, but I believe this to
be its outcome rather than what originates it. The presence of such sort of awareness in
a philosophical theory is a symptom of the disease, but not its underlying mechanism. 
In this paper, I attempt to offer a description of the framework of givenness. I present
what I believe to be the two elements that constitute the structure of the Myth and track
them in three of its episodes. Leaving specificity for later, we can say that these elements
are certain explanatory commitments undertaken in the course of accounting for central
aspects of intentional phenomena such as thought and language. When suitably
combined, they render both language and thought unintelligible. 
The episodes I shall examine stand in an ascendant order. The third, which deals with
the justification of observation reports, rests on the second, which deals with the
meaning of observation predicates; and the second, in turn, rests on the first, whose topic
is the normativity of language itself. In the three of them we shall find some sort of
unexplained awareness, but in each case, different (although related) unexplained
properties or, more strictly, proprieties, of that awareness will be relevant. Specifically,
what I take to be unexplained in the first episode is the normativity of the awareness, in
the second, its content or meaning, and in the third, its justification or authority. I will
hopefully be able to show that the Myth’s original failure with normativity reappears in
the more complex contexts of the second and third episode. If an image is required, we
can think of a snowball getting bigger and bigger as it rolls down a mountain. 
I
In the first episode, which we find in the opening paragraphs of Some Reflections on
Language Games, we are presented with the Myth in its rationalistic –and therefore less
subtle– form. To begin with, I shall say something about language games.
Sellars construes linguistic behavior as essentially belonging to the class of things
that can be characterized as correct or incorrect. If we are unable to take this seriously
into account, we will be precluded from understanding those species of correctness that
are meaning and justification as they apply to language. In order to account for the
possibility of correction or incorrection of linguistic behavior, that is, in order to capture
the normativity of language, Sellars believes it useful to compare languages with games.
2 For example, Heck (2000), McDowell (1994), Lance & Kukla (2009). In Redding (2007) we find a
remarkable exception, especially in his discussion of what he calls «the logical myth of the given».
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This is because games provide a fairly intuitive model for normativity, viz., the model
of rule-following. Playing checkers is not moving the checkers randomly but according
to rules. In the same way, speaking a language is not just uttering sounds but uttering
rule-conforming sounds. The heart of the analogy consists then in that –as much as a
genuine move in a game– genuine linguistic behavior is somehow determined by rules.3
A language, then, is a set of signs whose use is subject to rules.4 If speaking or
writing it is like making a move in a game, then learning it must consist in learning how
to make the moves, that is, in learning to obey the rules. There exists nevertheless a
famous objection to this line of thought. It goes like this:
Learning a language L is learning to obey the rules for L. But rules are, in fact,
sentences that contain expressions for the actions they enjoin. Therefore, linguistic rules
must contain expressions for the linguistic actions or utterances they enjoin. In other
words, they must contain meta-linguistic expressions. So, learning language L
presupposes the mastery of a meta-language ML. By the same token, learning ML
presupposes having learned MML, and so on. But this impossible, a vicious regress.
Therefore, the thesis must be rejected.5
At first sight, the vicious regress seems to be a consequence of the assumption that
following any rule presupposes the mastery of a language of rules. If this were the
problem, it would easily disappear if we could show that following rules does not
presuppose speaking any language. And this is precisely the task that Metaphysicus
Platonicus, the Hero of the first episode of the Myth of The Given, sets for himself. 
Metaphyicus –it is wise to remember it– is a character designed by Sellars to
advocate the most extreme rationalistic positions, so we must not be surprised that he
argues in the following way:
Just as we can distinguish a realm of propositions that are different from the
sentences that express them, the former constituting the meanings of the latter, we can
also abstract the meanings of those sentences that are rules from their mere verbal
expression. Thus, we would have a realm of demands (akin to that of propositions) that
we can grasp and therefore obey without having to master any language.6 And so the
regress is avoided. 
Implicit in the preceding argument is what I regard as the first of two elements that
constitute the structure of the Myth of the Given. This element consists in understanding
the relation between language and thought under the model of expression. According to
it, language is simply a means of expressing or exteriorizing antecedently formed
thoughts; thoughts, that is, whose content is completely independent of their mere verbal
formulation or «clothing». So linguistic meaning is parasitic upon intentional thought. It
is the assumption of this model that allows Metaphysicus to argue that rules (sentences
that express demands) are utterly dispensable; for everything we need to obey or follow
demands, for our behavior to be determined by demands, is that we grasp them, and that
3 Or, as Sellars puts it, an utterance constitutes a linguistic episode insofar as it is made as a move in a
game (SRLG, §6). 
4 SRLG, §1. 
5 SRLG, §2. 
6 SRLG, §§7-8. 
2 Giromini:Anthony Bonner  11/04/16  9:22  Página 19
20
we can do without any sort of linguistic skill: we are sufficiently furnished with the
powers of the Eye of the Mind. 
I need not to say that Metaphysicus’ answer is not much persuasive, what I would
like to show now is that it’s just by courtesy that we call it an answer, for in no way it
succeeds in avoiding the regress. To see this point, we must bear in mind that the
grasping of demands that comes to substitute the mastery of a meta-language in
Metaphysicus’ argument is itself something can be correctly or incorrectly done,
constituting therefore a move. Making a move in a language game, then, presupposes a
capacity to make moves in, say, the game of intellectual intuition. If this is right, then
we can only make intelligible the normativity of language by assuming the normativity
of thought.
This indirect explanatory strategy, suited to the expressionist model of language,
clashes with the second constitutive element of the Myth of the Given, namely, the
conception of rule following implicit in Metaphysicus’ argument, according to which
behavior is governed or determined by rules insofar as the subject who produces the
behavior explicitly grasps the rule. That is, insofar as the subject is aware of a rule.7
Obeying a rule (or demand) does not consist simply in doing what the rule prescribes
in the circumstances prescribed; if this were the case, any uniform behavior (animate or
inanimate) would obey rules. It also requires that what is done be done because so it is
prescribed by the rule.8 When we say that the rule determines behavior we mean that the
rule is somehow involved in the bringing about of the behavior. As Sellars grants it, this
is the core of truth of Metaphysicus account.9 His failure comes when he tries to explain
the «somehow» of the contribution of the rule.
According to Metaphysicus, the rule is involved in the production of the behavior by
way of being grasped by the speaker or, more strictly, by way of the demand it expresses
being grasped by the speaker. So it turns out that making any move presupposes not the
mastery of a language of rules but the grasping of a demand and if, as we have
acknowledged, that grasping is itself a move, then the regress is on again. Actually, it
was never gone but just relocated at the level of thought. 
So here we have the «mechanism» of the Myth. In order to explain the normativity
of language Metaphysicus resorts to certain moves (graspings of rules) the normativity
of which leaves without explanation. If we asked for one, he would be faced with two
equally unsatisfactory alternatives. Either trying to explain the moves of intellectual
intuition in terms of rule-following, hastening himself into the infinite regress, or
admitting that he has no answer, that the normativity of thought is an unmoved mover,
something that explains but is not explained, something that should not be put in
question, in one word, something merely given. 
Before turning to the next episode, let me pause to stress some connections between
the two elements I isolated. It is clear enough that they complement each other. On the
one hand, a conception of linguistic rule following that rests on the grasping of demands
7 SRLG, §11. 
8 SRLG, §6. A similar point is put forward in EPM, §33.  
9 SRLG, 11.  
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is obviously committed to the priority of thought over language that the expressionist
model emphasizes. But, on the other, we must bear in mind that this grasping of
«demands» was introduced by Metaphysicus in his attempt to rescue a conception of
rule-following according to which, as Sellars puts it, all correctness is correctness of
action.10 The requirement that one grasps the rule (in its meta-linguistic form) or its
meaning (in Metaphysicus’ variation) in order to obey it is the result of conceiving all
normatively significant behavior as a sort of intentional action, that is, an action
performed with a previously formed intention. Therefore, all rules in this model are
construed as rules of action.11 The problem with this conception is that, as we saw, the
intention alluded presupposes normativity.12
When we apply the model of action to language use, what we get is an
instrumentalist conception of linguistic behavior,13 according to which all «languaging»
is taken to be like promising or insulting. And here we are led back to the expressionist
model, for we can put its contention in the following way: we use language to perform
intentional actions the most important of which is expressing our thoughts.14
Much of Some Reflections on Language Games is devoted to developing an account
of normativity devoid of this intellectualist bias15. It would be very instructing to dwell
on it, but my focus here is on the problem, not on the solution, and the time for the
second episode has now come. 
II
The rationalist Metaphyiscus Platonicus will abandon the stage in the following
episodes. A logical positivist will replace him. This is an exchange to be noted, for
twentieth century empiricism– being aware of its rationalistic commitments –pretends to
reject the expressionist model of language.16 We shall see that, despite his good will, the
logical empiricist of the following episodes ends up showing the two very rationalistic
elements we mentioned before. And this is because he inherits Metaphysicus’
conception of rule-following. 
10 EPM §33. 
11 Rules of action or ‘ought-to-do’s are, according to Sellars, norms that must be grasped in order to be
obeyed. (LTC, I). Although he does not relate it to the Myth of the Given, in (1994:18-26) Brandom, under the
heading of ‘regulism’, discusses and attacks this conception. 
12 Not only in its content but also in its force. If intentions are going to be distinguished from mere
descriptions, they have to be something like practical commitments. This is exactly the definition of intention
that Sellars endorses (FCET, §2).
13 EPM, XV, §58. 
14 LTC, III. 
15 Sellars’ main challenge is to make sense of the notion of a behavior (which he terms ‘pattern governed
behavior’) that, nevertheless being determined by rules, does not presuppose the grasping of them. 
16 Oftentimes Sellars observes that the empiricists that fall prey of the Myth are the same moderni that
embrace nominalism, that refuse to give thought any priority over language, and emphatically reject any sort
of non-symbolic apprehension of facts  (LRB, §23). 
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Before turning to our task, a brief point concerning rules of action is on our way. If
we admit that the form of a rule of action is something like: «Do A when you are in C»,
then we should note that Metaphysicus’ requirement that we grasp the rule in order to
obey it includes not only that we have the concept of the action prescribed (A) but also
the concept of its circumstances of application (C),17 that is, it requires that we be
capable of recognizing the circumstances in which the action is to be performed. It is
precisely this capacity to recognize C that, although in different levels, causes all the
troubles we shall encounter. 
In the first scene of the second episode we have one of Sellars’ favorite targets: the
relational or «associationistic» conception of meaning sustained by classical empiricism.
According to it, the empirical meaning or content language possesses is due to the
existence of certain predicates that are immediately applied to experience, these we call
observation predicates. The meaning of these observation predicates is determined by a
relation between words and objects of experience, namely, that of association. And this
association, in turn, is understood in terms of learned responses. Thus, the noise ‘red’
means the quality red or the class of red things when I utter it because I have learned to
make that noise when I have a red thing in front of me. 
We shall leave aside the unwelcome atomistic consequences of the relational picture;
what concerns us now is that our empiricist, trying to cope with the normative aspect of
meaning, attempts to codify the association we mentioned in terms of rules. My response
‘red’ to red objects will be taken to be a move, a rule-obeying behavior. And so, the
meaning of the word ‘red’ will be determined by a rule that could be stated thus: «Utter
the noise ‘red’ (A) whenever you are presented with a red object (C),» Such rules bear
the name of semantic rules.18
Semantic rules, so conceived, are of course rules of action. So if our words are to
have empirical meaning, then we should be able to grasp semantic rules. This awareness
of the rule, as we saw, involved having the concept of the circumstances of application.
Hence, obeying the semantic rule for ‘red’ implies that we be capable of recognizing the
presence of red objects. And if the rule is going to explain us the meaning of ‘red’, this
recognition, of course, must not involve our mastery of that predicate. The general lines
that this story shall take we are already acquainted with. 
The empiricist sought to explain us the meaning of observational predicates in terms
of learned responses to objects of experience. This learned responses he takes to be
moves, particularly, moves enjoined by a semantic rule. But as we are required to grasp
the rule in order to obey it, it turns out that a condition for my word ‘red’ having any
meaning is that I be capable of having thoughts about red things. And this is, for certain,
an instance of the expressionist model of language.19
17 LTC, I. ITSA §8.  
18 Although Sellars attacks the relational picture of meaning (and its semantic rules) in many places (i.e,
LRB; IM, V; EPM, VII), we find the most developed critique in ITSA §§7-8. 
19 How are we to escape the consequence that the utterance of ‘red’ is just the expression of a previously
formed thought about something red if we accept that this priority is a condition for observation words having
meaning anything at all? 
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One last question and the Myth will be completely unveiled. How do we explain the
capacity, assumed in the grasping of semantic rules, to recognize empirical aspects of
reality? The meaning of language is explained by invoking the intentionality of thought,
but what explanation is available for the latter? Whatever this explanation turns out to
involve, direct apprehensions of universals, abstractions of ideas from sensations or
simply innate notions, if the empiricist is going to take into account the normative
aspects of the intentionality of thought, as he did with linguistic meaning, he would have
to introduce some sort of «intentional rules» to explain thought-world associations. But
in accordance with the model of normativity sustained by him, this «intentional rules»
must be rules of action. So he has again two desperate alternatives. Acknowledging that
the following of «intentional rules» requires, no less than their semantic counterpart, that
we have a prior capacity to recognize its circumstances of application, and so, revolving
in the first spirals of an infinite regress. Or acknowledging that he has no explanation,
that in his account of empirical linguistic meaning, the capacity to recognize the
circumstances of application of semantic rules, and so empirical aspects of reality, is
something merely given. 
III
The third episode is surely the most famous. The place to find it is the much
discussed and quoted Section VIII of the much discussed and quoted Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind. Fortunately enough, its exam we will not require the introduction
of any new elements, for its structure is virtually identical to the second one’s. Our focus
here, however, shall not be in a general capacity to recognize aspects of the empirical
world but rather in particular empirical judgments. We will not deal with the meaning
of observation predicates but rather with the justification of particular applications of
them.  
Section VIII bears the title ‘Does empirical knowledge have a foundation?’ The hero
of this episode, our familiar logical positivist, wants to answer affirmatively. The two
aspects that Sellars distinguishes in the idea of a foundation you must know by heart.20
For our present purposes, it would be enough to say that, if such a foundation were to
exist, it would need to have ultimate authority. That is, its authority or justification
should not be relative to the authority of anything else. 
Since what concerns us is empirical knowledge, the foundation that is required must
be a stratum of factual claims. Our empiricist argues that there are, indeed, some factual
claims invested with ultimate authority, namely, those judgments in which we apply
observation predicates directly to objects of experience. ‘Direct application’ means here
that observation predicates are applied to objects individuated or referred to as ‘this’.
These judgments made in the appropriate circumstances, like ‘this is black’ said in front
of a black thing, constitute observation reports. The permanent and mostly unchallenged
use of these reports in daily life suggests that they have authority; how does the
empiricist account for it?
20 EPM, VIII, § 32. 
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This is the stage when the third episode is blended with the second, for our hero
performs a witty maneuver in which he tries to tie the meaningfulness of observation
predicates with the justification of their application.21
His first step is to call to mind that, besides observational reports, only analytical
judgments seem to have ultimate authority. Only someone who ignored the meanings of
the words I use in saying that ‘cars are means of transportation’ would demand a
justification from me. Analytical judgments, then, owe their authority to themselves, or,
more strictly, to the meanings of the words they include. For the truth of an analytical
judgment to be acknowledged it suffices that we use the words correctly. And here,
«using the words correctly» has the sense of «using them according to their meaning». 
His second step is claiming that, for observation reports, correct use is also sufficient
to warrant truth. «Under which circumstances» he inquires «the report ‘this is blue’
would be true?» to which he answers «evidently, when we have a blue object in front of
us», «but we must surely acknowledge» he continues «that these would be the only
circumstances in which we would use that words, given that we know how to use them».
We cannot identify an object by the indexical ‘this’ if we have no perceptual access to
it, that is, if it is not in front of us, but if our responses to objects of experience are what
they should be, that is, if we have learned the meanings of observation predicates, then
we will not characterize a blue object save by the word ‘blue’. We only do justice to the
meanings of the words involved in observational reports when we make them in the
conditions that verify them. If they have sense, they are true. So we would have what we
were looking for, factual claims invested with ultimate authority. 
This clever argument is also the empiricist doom, because he has made no
amendments to his notion of semantic rules, and it is precisely in terms of those rules
that he understands the use according to meaning of observational predicates.  It should
be emphasized that, unlike the preceding episode, our concern here is not with the
possibility of following semantic rules, possibility that required the grasping of the rule
and therefore, the acquisition of empirically contentful states that was under discussion,
what concerns us here is rather the actual or effective following of a semantic rule in a
particular occasion.  
The empiricist claims that if we are in effect obeying the semantic rule for ‘blue’, if
we are using that word according to its meaning, then we will say ‘this is blue’ only
when this sentence is true. So he is assuming much more this time: not only that we have
the concept Blue, that we can be aware of blue things (awareness without which we
wouldn’t even be able to follow semantic rules), he also assumes that our awareness of
C is in this particular case accurate, correct, justified or authoritative because, ex
hypothesy, we have managed to successfully do what the rule prescribed. So we see that,
once again, to explain a human we posit a god: for a stratum of ultimate authoritative
knowledge of particular matter of fact is assumed or merely given in the successful
following of semantic rules that the empiricist invoked to account for the authoritative
knowledge of particular matter of fact expressed by observation reports. 
21 The strategy is introduced by Mortiz Schlick (1959) in a paper that bears –except for the quotation
marks– the very same title of Section VIII. Also by Ayer (1954) in one of his many moods. 
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I would like to end by quoting a very well known passage from Section VIII. We
shall see Sellars himself pointing out the two elements in which I have been insisting for
too long by now:
«34. (…) it is clear that if observation reports are construed as actions, if their correctness
is interpreted as the correctness of an action, and if the authority of an observation report
is construed as the fact that making it is “following a rule” in the proper sense of the
phrase, then we are face to face with givenness in its most straightforward form. For these
stipulations commit one to the idea that the authority of Konstatierungen [observation
reports] rests on nonverbal episodes of awareness –awareness that something is the case,
e.g. that this is green– which nonverbal episodes have an intrinsic authority (they are, so
to speak, ‘self-authenticating’) which the the verbal performances (the Konstatierungen)
properly performed “express”».22
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